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Emotions, Phantasia and Feeling in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric
Heleen J. Pott
Over the past three decades, phlosophy has seen a remarkable revval of nterest n 
the concept of emoton and wth t a reassessment of the role of the pathê n the work 
of Arstotle. Qute a number of scholars clam hm as the first phlosopher to defend a 
cogntve approach n emoton theory. I wll argue that ths clam s one-sded and that 
hs dscussons of the passons dffer markedly from contemporary cogntve vews of 
emoton. 
Introduction 
Arstotle was the first phlosopher who took the emotons serously; thus wrtes 
Wllam Lyons n The Handbook of Cognition and Emotion (Power and Dalglesh, 
1999:23). Unlke Plato, who looked upon them wth deep suspcon and even outrght 
contempt, Arstotle took a favourable vew. He stressed ther cogntve functon and 
ther role n ethcs and poltcs, and, accordng to Lyons, can be seen as a forerunner 
of present-day cogntve emoton theores. 
Fortenbaugh (1975), Nussbaum (1996, 2001) and many others jon Lyons n hs 
prase for Arstotle. Accordng to Martha Nussbaum (1996:303), n “Arstotle’s vew, 
emotons are not blnd anmal forces, but ntellgent and dscrmnatng parts of the 
personalty, closely related to belefs of a certan sort, and therefore responsve to cog-
ntve modficaton”. 
In ths paper I examne the role of Arstotle’s deas n the contemporary debate on 
emotons. I wll argue that squeezng Arstotle nto a cogntvst mould s a mstake. 
From varous texts dealng wth the emotons — not only n the Rhetoric but also n 
On the Soul and the History of Animals — a more sophstcated account can be peced 
together, wth mportant mplcatons for current dscussons on emoton theory. 
Emotions in the Art of Rhetoric 
Pathos (from paschein, to suffer or be acted upon) lterally means: “somethng suf-
fered”. The noton refers to an event that takes place accdentally, through external 
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factors, somethng we undergo as a contngent change. In the sphere of the psycho-
logcal, pathos can ndcate any affecton or emoton the soul s susceptble to. Ars-
totle’s best known account of the emotonal pathê s found n the Rhetoric (II, 1–11), 
where he dscusses fourteen emotons n detal: anger and gentleness, love and hate, 
fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, pty and ndgnaton, benevolence 
and selfishness, and finally envy and emulaton. He defines them as “those thngs 
through whch, by beng turned around, people change n ther judgments (kriseis), 
and whch are accompaned by pan and pleasure, such as anger, pty, fear, and other 
such thngs and ther oppostes” (1378a19–22). 
Accordng to Fortenbaugh (1975), the dscovery of an ntmate connecton be-
tween emoton and judgment les at the heart of Arstotle’s dvson of the soul nto a 
logcal part, and a part whch s tself non-logcal, but lstens to reason. Whle Plato 
put the passons n the group of rratonal bodly feelngs, Arstotle saw them as the 
result of a subtle nterplay between the two parts of the soul. He defines anger as “a 
desre for revenge, accompaned by dstress, as a result of (dia) an apparently unjus-
tfied slght whch was drected to oneself or to those near to one” (1378a30–34). 
Fortenbaugh ponts out that the emoton of anger ncludes the thought of a slght 
that was unjustfied, so that ths thought s mentoned n the definton. The defin-
ton of fear ncludes the thought of mmnent danger, brngng destructon or pan 
(1382a21–2). Fear s not a prmtve bodly dsturbance but a complex phenomenon, 
nvolvng fearful belefs and judgments that are a necessary condton for the emoton 
(Fortenbaugh, 1975:12). 
The emoton of pty has an even more complex cogntve scenaro, as Martha Nuss-
baum llustrates n her analyss of emotons n the Rhetoric. Frst, we must beleve that 
the person we pty does not deserve msfortune, for f he could be blamed, we would 
thnk that he gets what he deserves and feel no pty (85b34–86a1). Second, t must be 
a msfortune whch we beleve could strke us too, because a person who thnks he s 
nvulnerable wll not feel pty. And finally, we must beleve that the sufferngs of the 
vctm are serous, otherwse they make too lttle mpresson to evoke pty (86a6–7). 
The lst of msfortunes ncludes death, bodly njury, old age, llness, uglness, and 
physcal handcaps (Nussbaum, 1996:308–9).
The sgnficance of ths analyss for a cogntve theory of the emotons s threefold, 
accordng to cogntve phlosophers. Frst, Arstotle makes t clear that “cogntons” 
(belefs, thoughts, judgments) ntate the emotonal response and are the necessary 
and n some cases even sufficent condtons of emoton. Fear s my belef that I am n 
danger, anger my belef that I am nsulted, sadness my belef that I suffered a loss, and 
so on. Second, the emotons are open to reason; they may be called reasonable and can 
be modfied by ratonal argument. And thrd, there s a sharp dstncton between 
cognton-based emotons, and bodly feelngs, that are only merely accdentally 
related to belefs or thoughts (cf. Fortenbaugh, 1979:134; Nussbaum, 1996:303–4). 
Over the past three decades, Arstotle has ganed a reputaton as a poneer of cog-
ntve emoton theory. The fact that so many scholars have read the Rhetoric through 
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the glasses of contemporary cogntvsm s not a concdence. Snce the late 1970s, 
“cognton”-based theores have been the touchstone for all debates on the subject. 
The term “cognton” was derved from psychology, where t referred to hgher forms 
of nformaton processng lke thnkng, evaluatng and problem solving. After a long 
perod of neglect under behavoursm, cogntve psychologsts redscovered the emo-
tons as ntentonal phenomena that are based on “apprasals”, evaluatve judgments 
n terms of values or concerns (Arnold, 1960).
Arstotle’s account s at first sght perfectly compatble wth the cogntve ap-
proach. Moreover, that there s no menton of bodly processes n the defintons n 
the Rhetoric seems to confirm the thess that physology s only contngently con-
nected wth emoton and that emotonal states can be sufficently explaned wthout 
takng nto account the underlyng bodly changes. Cogntve emoton phlosophers 
are ready to assume that ths lack of nterest n the physcal bass of emotons proves 
that he s n favour of a proto-functonalst phlosophy of mnd (Power and Dalglesh, 
1997:42–43).
Accordng to psychologcal functonalsm, mental states are dentfied by ther 
functon rather than by what they are made of. Mental functonalsts attrbute a causal 
role to conscousness, wthout makng any further ontologcal clams on the nature 
of the mental. They say for nstance that emotons can be realzed n any cogntve 
system that s sutable qua organsaton, regardless of whether t s a lvng body or a 
computer. Accordng to Nussbaum, ths vew of the mnd-body relaton was antc-
pated n Arstotle’s hylêmorfism. In Arstotle’s psychology, she wrtes (Nussbaum, 
1978:146), “the soul s the form or functonal organzaton of the body, whle the var-
ous ‘parts of soul’ are functonal materal states”. Elsewhere she says that for Arstotle 
the relaton between the vtal functons and matter s purely contngent, and that the 
same mental actvty can be realzed n a varety of specfic materals (Nussbaum and 
Putnam, 1992:33; LaRock, 2002:234).
Animal emotions
Although the cogntve readng has nterestng thngs to say about Arstotle’s treat-
ment of the emotons, t also poses some serous problems. For example, f t s true 
that Arstotle defends a cogntve vew and f emotons n Arstotle do lsten to reason 
and argument, how can he ascrbe emotons to anmals?
In numerous passages Arstotle speaks about emotons lke fear, jealousy and love 
n anmals. About the eagle he says n the Historia Animalium that “t expels hs nest-
lngs because of jealousy, because by nature t s envous and voracous” (HA VIII 34, 
619b27–31). He also says that anmals have a number of psychologcal characterstcs 
whch n humans are called vrtues, lke beng quet or wld, calm or rrtable, coura-
geous or cowardly, fearful or relaxed (HA VII, 588a18–31; Shvola, 1996:132).
Arstotle even seems to notce pty n anmals. He tells of two dolphns swm-
mng beneath a dead baby dolphn, and each tme t threatens to snk to the bottom 
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they take the lttle dolphn on ther backs — as f out of pty, he wrtes (HA VIII 48: 
631a145–200). Asde from ths, he often talks about the gentleness and frendlness 
of dolphns, and how much they love ther young. If Arstotle serously beleved that 
complex mental operatons lke thnkng and judgng are necessary condtons for 
emotons, then anmals cannot be jealous or angry or sorry, because n Arstotle’s 
vew, anmals have no capacty for complex thoughts or judgments.
Although ths reads lke a real knock-down argument aganst the cogntve vew, t 
turns out not to be. The problem of anmal emotons has been wdely dscussed over 
the past ten years, resultng n an nterestng modficaton of the cogntve poston 
(Shvola, 1996). Scholars took a thorough second look at Arstotle’s lst of emotons 
and concluded that t contans only one definton wth a cogntve term referrng 
to an artculated belef or thought.1 Most of the other defintons refer to the cogn-
tve component n terms of phantasia and the verb phainesthai. For nstance, fear s 
defined as a knd of pan and dstress as a result of the phantasia of a threatenngly 
dangerous or panfully damagng thng (1382a21–3). Arstotle adds that these dan-
gerous thngs must appear (phainêtai) close by, and not far away. It s also necessary 
that they gve the mpresson (phainêtai) of havng the great potental for nflctng 
destructon and sufferng (1382a17–19). Anger follows a presumed nsult (phain-
omenên oligôrian) and Arstotle wrtes that people lke to phantasze about future 
revenge, and ths phantasia s pleasant. Pty s a knd of pan concernng what looks 
lke (phainomenoi) a destructve and panful evl that happens to someone who does 
not deserve t, an evl whch can strke oneself too (1385b13–6). And so on. 
So t s phantasia and not doxa that appears tme and agan as the cogntve con-
sttuent of emoton (Shvola, 1996:115–116). Its prmary functon s to synthesze 
and nterpret sensory observatons, to “see somethng n terms of somethng”. The 
man dfference from doxa s that phantasia brdges the gap wth the senses (Neu-
wenburg, 2002:99). Phantasia s usually nterpreted as an mpresson, a vague per-
cepton of somethng whch happens at ths moment, or occurs n the past or the 
future (1370a34–5). That means that the phantasia may also be an unreflected, half 
conscous mpresson, a memory or a phantasy. The emoton based on phantasia 
need not be lngustcally artculated, or susceptble to reason. It may be aroused by 
vague vsual mpressons or eere sounds: we shver although we know there s no 
danger ahead, as everyone knows from experence. Phantasia can occur n humans 
as well as n anmals, who have, accordng to Arstotle, phantasia, but not doxa.
Bodily changes, feelings and irrationality
Wth ths modficaton of the cogntve component the problem of emotons n an-
mals s solved. By stretchng the meanng of the cogntve component and ncludng 
1 Love and frendshp, says Arstotle, s wshng for someone else what you thnk (oietai) s good for that 
person, and not for yourself (1380b35–6).
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non-ratonal, non-reflectve judgments or perceptons, we can explan how anmals 
relate emotonally to the world. 
Yet, a second, more serous dfference wth the cogntve vew remans. It s the 
sgnficant amount of attenton Arstotle gves to the physcal aspect of the emo-
tons — not so much n the Rhetoric, but n De Anima. There he makes t clear that 
all pathê of the soul are ntmately connected wth the body, and that the physology 
of the passons cannot be consdered a secondary or merely contngent matter, as 
cogntve theorsts tend to assume. 
In De Anima Arstotle calls the emotons logoi enhulai, materalzed deas. They 
can be defined n two dfferent ways (DA I, 1 403a2). For the phusikos, who concen-
trates on the materal aspect of the emoton, anger s the bolng of blood or another 
warm substance around the heart (403a25–403b10). For the dalectcan, who s 
nterested n the formal sde of emoton, anger s a desre for revenge as a result of an 
unjust nsult. Both descrptons refer to what “anger” really s and Arstotle leaves us 
n no doubt that ths emoton cannot arse n a bodless bran, nor can t be reduced 
to bolng blood around the heart — what matters s that the blood bols with anger. 
That the emotons are dentfied both by ther physcal and by ther ntentonal con-
dtons, leaves no room for an explanaton of hs hylêmorfism n terms of ether men-
tal functonalsm or materalsm (Rorty, 1984; LaRock, 2002).
It becomes clear from another example how crucal the bodly aspect of the emo-
tons s for Arstotle. Some people, Arstotle says, meet serous opposton wthout 
Plato (left) and Arstotle, a detal of The School of 
Athens, a fresco by Raphael
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becomng angry, but at other tmes they are totally enraged by nsgnficant thngs. 
That happens, he says, when “ther body s n the same swollen state as when they 
are angry.” (DA 403a19–24). It s not a cogntve belef that trggers the emoton; the 
anger s already there, as a dsposton that has ts orgns elsewhere. The same can 
be true for fear: we can be fearful wthout a reason, whch means that the emoton 
fear can occur wthout relevant cogntons (DA 404a23–25), as a result of somatc 
or other dspostons. Ths fear cannot be easly regulated or altered by arguments, 
let alone dsmssed. In the Rhetoric (1389b29–32) these knds of unreasonable, cog-
ntvely mpenetrable fears are connected wth old age and ts attendant fall of body 
temperature; n Partes Animalium (650b27–30) Arstotle mentons the role of watery 
blood.
Just as troublesome for the cogntvst standard vew s the fact, drectly connected 
wth ths, that Arstotle does not bother wth the cogntve dogma that feelings, on 
account of ther physologcal background, should not play a role n the definton 
of an emoton. From a cogntve pont of vew feelings are subjectve sensatons pro-
duced by the body, resonances of physcal changes and of secondary mportance. But 
for Arstotle feelings can be essental. From hs lst n the Rhetoric t s clear that he 
does not hestate to straghtforwardly call some emotons lupai — pans, unpleasant 
feelngs; “Let us call fear a lupê because of the phantasia of a destructve and panful 
event n the future” (1382a21–2). Here, feelng s not a sde effect, but an essental 
consttuent of the emoton, and the relaton between emoton and feelng s concep-
tual and not causal (Leghton, 1996:219–220; Neuwenburg, 2002:88). Shame and 
pty are also called lupai, just as ndgnaton and envy. 
In these cases the feelng qualty enters nto the definton tself, wthout however 
affectng the cogntve structure of the emoton. That s why Arstotle’s descrpton 
of these panful feelngs dffers sgnficantly from the cogntvst charactersaton: 
Arstotle’s feelngs are not prmtve sensatons, nor sde effects of a cognton, nor 
perceptons of bodly states, and they are not margnal for the phenomenology of the 
emotonal experence. They are “feelngs towards” (Golde, 2000) or “felt evaluatons” 
(Helm, 2002), that have ntentonalty and consttute how we find ourselves n the 
world.
Ths makes the use of the term “cogntve” for Arstotle’s dealngs wth emotons 
n the Rhetoric even more problematc — that s, f we take a cogntve theory as a 
theory that states that the bodly and feelng aspects of an emoton are less mportant 
than the cogntve ones and whch ascrbes to the cogntve component an exclusve 
and essental role.
Emotions, moods and dispositions  
A final dfference wth the cogntve vew s that the pathê n Arstotle’s works are 
not only short term emotonal reactons wth a well defined cogntve startng pont. 
They also nclude moods and dspostons that have a longer duraton. For nstance, 
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hs lst n the Rhetoric mentons gentleness (as the opposte of anger), confidence 
(as the opposte of fear), love and hate (1378a18–19), benevolence and selfishness, 
eagerness to match others — all long-term emotonal dspostons, wth a dffuse 
object orentaton. For example, gentleness, accordng to Arstotle, does not usually 
have a cogntve orgn, but s manly the result of a prosperous and panless lfe. 
For an orator such stabler long term moods or dspostons are at least as mpor-
tant as short term occurrng emotons. Arstotle says so hmself: “We judge not n 
the same way when we feel unhappy or happy, frendly or unfrendly” (1356a4–6). 
The audence reacts to rhetorcal arguments from a certan background dspos-
ton that colours present judgments. But such moods n the background can easly 
change nto abrupt emotons n the foreground: frendlness can turn nto anger or 
hostlty, confidence nto fear, pty nto ndgnaton, wth all poltcal consequences 
nvolved.
So t s obvous that the phenomena that fall under the emotonal pathê n Arsto-
tle’s works can be long-term or short-term, reasonable or unreasonable, urgent emo-
tonal reactons but also stable moods or dspostons. They can show a hgh or low 
level of cogntve complexty and they can be specfically human, or we can share 
them wth anmals. Ths heterogenety s n accordance wth the orgnal meanng of 
pathos, as a very broad noton whch refers to somethng that happens to us, an event 
that takes place through external factors. Arstotle ponts out that the emotonal pathê 
have ntentonalty and are accompaned by pleasant or unpleasant feelngs, but oth-
erwse there s no sharp dstncton from psychologcal pathê. As pathos has ts orgn 
n dffuse common usage, the emotons do not form a natural class of psychologcal 
states, as A. Rorty argues (1984:522–3). 
In any case, t s clear that Arstotle’s pathos s much more heterogeneous than 
the modern “emoton”, whch was conceved as a psychologcal category at the end 
of the nneteenth century, ts meanng coned n a strctly scentfic context. In the 
course of the twenteth century, “emoton” became the new term for phenomena 
whch can be categorzed as acute emotonal reactons to an object or event that 
causes a notceable change n the bodly and psychc balance (Dxon, 2003). Empr-
cal research has carved up ths sharply defined emoton nto separate, emprcally 
ndvduated components (cognton, feelng, expresson, acton readness, bod-
ly change), n order to develop a comprehensve scentfic theory of the emotons 
whch could answer questons about causal relatons and necessary and/or suffi-
cent condtons. 
Arstotle had an open mnd to the phenomenologcal rchness of the passons 
and saw no reason to solate a selecton of them as the natural class of emotons. He 
was not nterested n a comprehensve scentfic theory ether, nor dd he see emo-
tons as the sum of cogntve, behavoural, and physologcal components. Arstotle 
worked wth a pre-analytcal vocabulary and studed the emotons n the context of 
general phlosophcal questons. In the Rhetoric he examned how emotons nflu-
ence publc opnon, n hs ethcal treatses how they nfluence moral vrtue and 
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freedom of the wll, and n De Anima how they relate to our bodly ndvduaton 
(Rorty, 1984:545).
The fact that Arstotle, n hs most extensve study, the Rhetoric, devoted so much 
attenton to cogntve aspects of the passons s not evdence for a proto-cogntve 
or proto-functonalst vew on mental states, but s the result of hs phlosophcal 
preoccupatons. As the context s rhetorcal, he does not dscuss the physology and 
bology of the passons, nor does he deal wth anmals. He ntroduces the passons 
n pars of oppostes because orators work wth unstable and changeable moods and 
emotons. Gentleness can suddenly make way for anger at the thought of an nsult. In 
the poltcal context of the Rhetoric, the emoton of anger s descrbed n terms of an 
acute senstvty to status-based ssues, as a response to a belttlng slght. As to how 
far ths humlated anger, eager for revenge, can be generalzed towards non-poltcal 
stuatons, s open to debate.
Conclusion
In concluson we may say that Arstotle shares two mportant nsghts wth contem-
porary cogntvsts, namely, first, that emotons are ntentonal states that have a cog-
ntve structure, and second, that the varous types of emotons (anger, fear, sadness, 
love, hate, etc.) are ndvduated on the bass of a cogntve crteron. The cogntvsts 
are wrong, however, to assume that Arstotle’s concept pathos refers to the same phe-
nomena as our contemporary “emoton”. Arstotle dd not narrow down the doman 
of the emotonal pathê nto the group of object-orented emotons wth a hgh com-
plexty, that are favoured by the cogntvsts. In hs vew, the anmal emotons and the 
cogntvely mpenetrable, non-ratonal emotons, feelngs and dspostons are just as 
nterestng as the ratonal emotons of orthodox cogntvsm. Therefore, as to the ds-
covery of Arstotle as a cogntvst avant la lettre, we may conclude that t s a form of 
“whggsh hstory”, whch says more about the blnd spots of contemporary emoton 
research than about Arstotle.
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